h1

In-Memory Evasion

February 8, 2018

Many analysts and automated solutions take advantage of various memory detections to find injected DLLs in memory. Memory detections look at the properties (and content) of processes, threads, and memory to find indicators of malicious activity in the current process.

In-memory Evasion is a four-part mini course on the cat and mouse game related to memory detections. This course is for red teams that want to update their tradecraft in this area. It’s also for blue teams that want to understand the red perspective on these techniques. Why do they work in some situations? How is it possible to work around these heuristics in other cases?

Part 1 of In-memory Evasion introduces Memory Detections. This lecture walks through the observable properties of Processes, Threads, and Memory with Process Hacker. Common heuristics, the in-memory indicators we want to evade, are covered too.

Part 2 of In-memory Evasion goes through A Payload’s Life. This lecture discusses the heuristics in Part 1 and where they interact with actions taken by a representative offense platform (in this case, Cobalt Strike). This lecture makes the case that offense toolsets do strange things, but in some cases, these deviations from normal program behavior are optional.

Part 3 of this course discusses Evasion. General tips to avoid the strange behavior these detections find are discussed. This lecture then gets into the meat: options to configure how Cobalt Strike’s Beacon payload lives in memory are explained and demonstrated. This lecture also shows how to conduct an OPSEC review of your configuration prior to action on a target. Finally, this lecture concludes with a discussion on process context and how it influences the amount of suspect actions/indicators an automated solution will allow.

Part 4 concludes the course with a brief discussion of Threat Emulation. Cobalt Strike’s flexibility in this area is demonstrated to steer an analyst to believe they’re dealing with a specific real-world actor in a simulated incident.

I’m a big believer that red teams should know the defenses they work with and know how their tools interact with these defenses. The area of memory detections has developed considerably over the past several years. Whether you’re on the red or blue side, I hope you find this perspective helpful.

One comment

  1. THANK YOU! So timely 🙂

    Do you have any specific input on carbon black evasion?

    Best Kim

    On Thu, 8 Feb 2018 at 15:04, Strategic Cyber LLC wrote:

    > rsmudge posted: “Many analysts and automated solutions take advantage of > various memory detections to find injected DLLs in memory. Memory > detections look at the properties (and content) of processes, threads, and > memory to find indicators of malicious activity in the cur” >



Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s